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Electoral Accountability and Fiscal Federalism: The Case of Peru 





Accountability is at the heart of the democratic enterprise. One commonly touted benefit of 
decentralization is that it promotes this accountability by allowing sub-national governments 
to target fiscal policy more precisely to the varying preferences of people in different locales. 
But if accountability is really functioning as it should, then citizens should use the ballot box 
to reward and punish local officials for their concrete policy behavior. In other words, we 
should not only be able to link the presence of decentralization with improvements in local 
public goods, but we should also be able to connect voting behavior in specific locales with the 
competence of local politicians. Because of the empirical challenges, few scholars have 
attempted test this prediction directly. Using government information as well as data coded for 
this project, we examine the case of Peru, assessing how measures of local government success 
affect the probability of reelection and recall. We find that, when Mayors manage their waste 
collection and education portfolios more effectively, they are more likely to win office in 
subsequent elections. They are also less likely to be removed in recall votes. More than that, 
when Mayors spend more overall, and especially when they spend more on capital projects, we 
find that their probability of reelection improves, and their risk of recall declines. Overall, our 
results show clearly that Peru’s citizens use their votes rationally to reward and punish locally 
elected politicians. This gives substance and support to the notion that, at least under certain 
circumstances, accountability can function well under decentralized government. 
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Accountability is at the heart of the democratic enterprise. If elections are to be 
meaningful, they should incentivize politicians to provide the combination of taxes, 
expenditures, and policies that their constituents desire. This is true for national governments, but 
it is even truer at the local level. Indeed, some authors have argued that accountability is the most 
salient advantage offered by fiscally decentralized systems (Seabright, 1996; Tommasi & 
Weinschelbaum, 2007). One commonly touted benefit of decentralization is that it allows sub-
national governments to target fiscal policy more precisely to the varying preferences of people 
in different locales (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972). Decentralization is also said to improve the 
flow of information between citizens and their elected officials, strengthening the ability of 
governments to understand their constituents’ wants and needs (Oates, 2005).  
 Advocates of decentralization see it as improving accountability in three key ways. 
Decentralization increases knowledge about citizen preferences, strengthens the incentives of 
officials to consider those preferences when making policy, and allows for different policies in 
different locales (Shah, 2003; Hankla, Martinez-Vazquez, & Ponce-Rodriguez, 2019). When 
decentralization works, therefore, we should observe that the provision of local public goods 
becomes more efficient and responsive to the needs and preferences of taxpayers. And when it 
does not, we should observe local politicians paying the price at the ballot box. 
Whether this happens in the real world is a critical question, with implications for 
whether decentralization can truly deliver on its promises. The bulk of the evidence that we have 
links the presence or absence of decentralization with performance and impact measures of local 
public good provision (Martinez-Vazquez, Lago-Peñas, & Sacchi, 2017). This is a useful 
approach and likely to be the only method of evaluating the question across numerous countries 





governments and the rewards and punishments doled out by voters. 
If accountability is really functioning as it should, citizens should use the ballot box to 
reward and punish local officials for their concrete policy behavior. In other words, we should 
not only be able to link the presence of decentralization with improvements in local public 
goods, but we should also be able to connect voting behavior in specific locales with the 
competence of local politicians. Using newly available, micro-level data on municipalities in 
Peru, we attempt in this article to do just that. 
 Peru’s municipalities have sole responsibility for solid waste disposal and joint 
responsibility for education, among other functions. Mayors are popularly elected every four 
years, but (unlike in many other countries) Peru also has a robust system of recall, though one 
which has been used less frequently since reforms in 2015 allowed removed Mayors to nominate 
their successors. Using information from the Peruvian government as well as data coded for this 
project, we examine how measures of local government performance affect the probability of 
reelection and recall.  
Peru’s municipalities are funded through a combination of transfers from the center and 
local revenues. Previous scholarship has especially emphasized the role of revenue 
decentralization in promoting accountability,1 and so, as we mention below, the significant role 
of transfers for Peru’s local governments makes the country a more challenging case for fiscal 
accountability. If accountability functions in Peru, it should also function in more fully 
decentralized systems. 
While Peru has received considerably less attention than many other countries from 
 






scholars of decentralization, its unusual recall system has been the subject of at least two 
important studies in recent years. Sexton (2019) conducts a field experiment in the country to test 
whether citizens attending training workshops on local government are better able to hold 
municipal leaders to account. He finds that these workshops are associated with more 
disillusionment in the political process, and he also shows that Mayors often reduce the quality 
of their performance when threatened with recall. This unanticipated official backlash to local 
accountability efforts points to a potential dark side to the recall process as practiced in Peru. 
Similarly, Holland and Incio (2019) show that the recall process in Peru can be the subject of 
abuse. Women Mayors, they find, are more likely to on the receiving end of recall petitions, as 
are Mayors elected by a small vote margin.  
While both papers point to the key role played by factors unrelated to performance, they 
find that the quality of Mayors does matter in recall elections. These findings, when taken on 
their own, are encouraging for the prospects of local accountability. However, both articles, 
despite their insights, rely on budgetary execution to measure performance and neither considers 
local elections themselves.  
Our project takes these findings to the next step by considering hard measures of policy 
outcomes at the local level. We also look at both elections and recalls, and we consider more 
detailed aspects of the fiscal profile of local governments. We find that, when local officials 
manage their waste collection and education portfolios more effectively, they are more likely to 
win office in subsequent elections. They are also less likely to be removed in recall votes. More 
than that, we find that their probability of reelection improves, and their risk of recall declines, 






Overall, our findings show clearly that Peru’s citizens use their votes rationally to reward 
and punish local officials. These finding give substance and support to the notion that, at least 
under certain circumstances, accountability can function well in decentralized governments. 
Indeed, given that Peru’s municipalities are largely dependent on central government transfers 
(see below), they are something of a hard case for decentralized accountability. After all, this 
accountability must function mostly through the expenditure side of local activity and is 
therefore more limited in scope than would be the case in more revenue decentralized systems, 
where raising own revenues brings more scrutiny from residents. The fact that local 
accountability nevertheless seems to function is therefore especially significant. 
Going forward, we structure this article as follows: Section 2 presents the literature 
review on electoral accountability, fiscal decentralization, and government performance. Section 
3 introduces our theory, as well as the testable hypotheses used in our empirical analysis. Section 
4 summarizes the main characteristics of Peruvian local governments. Section 5 describes the 
data and the empirical methodology, while Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 
concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Elections and Accountability 
Accountability, as defined by Seabright (1996), is the ability of citizens to elect or reject a 
government according to their evaluation of the government's performance. Institutions of local 
accountability aim to improve the efficiency of public spending by encouraging officials to 
design and deliver services in line with the demands of their citizens. The importance of these 
institutions, as described by Bovens (2005), lies in enhancing the legitimacy of public 
governance by allowing democratic control and improving performance. The focus of our article 






Elections are obviously the key mechanisms of electoral accountability, but they are 
sometimes supplemented by another institutional feature: the direct recall. This mechanism 
allows a pre-specified number of citizens to demand a popular vote on whether an elected official 
should be removed from office before the end of their term. There are, of course, similarities 
between elections and recalls. Both represent regularized means for citizens to reward or 
sanction elected public officials (Timmons & Garfias, 2015). That said, recalls – unlike elections 
– allow the removal of elected representatives before the end of their regular terms, with voters 
overseeing the collection of signatures to initiate the process. While in the case of elections, 
voters’ decisions will likely reflect both prospective and retrospective evaluations, the recall 
decision is generally based entirely on evaluations of the past (Yilmaz, Beris, & Serrano-Berthet, 
2008). Recall activation is expected to be more frequent in contexts of political distrust in the 
government’s performance (Bowler, 2004).2  
Scholars generally approach accountability using one of several theoretical lenses, the 
principal-agent model and the theory of economic voting prominent among them. According to 
the principal-agent model, the principals (voters) delegate to the agents (elected officials) a set of 
instruments to execute certain goals. A problem arises because the interests of the principal and 
the agent may be different, which can create inefficiencies and corruption (Adsera, Boix, & 
Payne, 2003).  
 
2 Other countries besides Peru allow the recall of elected officials, including some Indian states (Mathew & Mathew, 
2003; Johnson, Deshingkar, & Start, 2005), and Ethiopia and Nigeria (Olowu, 2003). A different version of recall is 
Bolivia’s “voto constructivo de censura” (constructive censorship vote), which allows the town council to remove 






In the context of economic voting theory, by contrast, elections are the mechanism 
through which citizens reward or punish incumbent parties and public officials for their relative 
success in managing the economy (Lewis-Beck & Nadeau, 2011). The threat of losing office in 
the next election or being revoked compels public officials to deliver quality services and to 
refrain from extracting rents (Barro, 1973). Moreover, individual vote choices are determined by 
the retrospective and prospective evaluation of candidates, as well as by the voter's party 
identification (Stein, 1990). In the retrospective evaluation, citizens examine whether the state of 
the world has improved under the elected public official's watch and vote accordingly. In other 
words, voters use elections to reward or punish politicians (Maravall, 2007; Packel, 2008). In the 
prospective evaluation, voters’ beliefs about the future performance of the economy influence 
their vote. Empirical work shows, however, that voters often make their choices based on factors 
beyond the governments’ performance (Carlin & Singh, 2015). It also indicates that voters 
sometimes fail to impose sanctions because they do not have the resources or skills to evaluate 
the governments’ performance or to properly assign the responsibility (Anderson, 2007; Bardhan 
& Mookherjee, 2006).  
Even when voters are ready to hold their representatives to account, the literature points 
to other factors that can influence the effectiveness of voter influence; these include the 
characteristics of the electoral system, the political regime, and the political parties (Eaton & 
Schroeder, 2010). For example, local elections are more likely to succeed in creating accountable 
governments if they are competitive and voters judge candidates on their ability to provide 
services (Schmitter & Karl, 1991). In the case of the recall elections, some researchers warn that 
the threat of recall could strengthen the power of the incumbent (Qvortrup, 2011). And, finally, 





since they only hold accountable elected officials, leaving out appointed bureaucrats (Ackerman, 
2004). All these findings leave open the question of how effective accountability operates at the 
local level, especially in cases of fiscal decentralization. 
2.2 Fiscal Decentralization and Accountability 
Fiscal decentralization refers to the transfer of authority and responsibilities from the 
central to subnational governments. This transfer can take the form of administrative 
decentralization, where bureaucratic offices are territorially organized and given discretion to 
make decisions on how best produce and deliver services; political decentralization, where local 
elections are held; and fiscal decentralization, where local governments receive the power to tax 
and spend (see Hankla, 2009). In this article, we are primarily concerned with the second two 
forms, and especially with the question of whether the accountability generated by political 
decentralization incentivizes local governments to make the expenditure decisions desired by 
their constituents. 
Broadly speaking (see Oates, 2005), the literature on decentralization has evolved from 
the discussion of the best allocation of competencies and revenue sources across levels of 
governments (first-generation theory) to an analysis that incorporates the role of institutions and 
public officials’ incentives (second-generation theory). According to the first-generation theory 
of fiscal federalism, the devolution of tax and expenditure authority to lower levels of 
government yields greater public sector efficiency; elected public officials are considered 
benevolent maximizers of the social welfare (Tiebout, 1956; Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972). 
Second generation scholars, by contrast, incorporate a public choice and political economy 





and the incentive effects of different intergovernmental arrangements (Weingast, 1995).3 
Whatever their differences, both the first and second generation literature agree that the 
benefits of both revenue and expenditure decentralization are contingent on the functioning of an 
effective accountability mechanism. On the expenditure side, fiscal decentralization allows sub-
national governments to target the provision of goods and services to the preferences of their 
constituents. When political decentralization is also present in the form of elections, sub-national 
governments should be accountable to these constituents and incentivized to provide the public 
goods they desire. They should also be accountable to their constituents for the management of 
their funds, including for budget balances and capital versus current expenditures. 
Past scholars, however, have particularly emphasized the importance of revenue 
decentralization in facilitating accountability (Bird, 2009). For example, Asatryan, Feld and Geys 
(2012) found evidence using a sample of OECD countries that greater revenue decentralization is 
associated with improved sub-national government budget balances. Of course, most countries, 
in practice, show large vertical imbalances, with subnational expenditures far exceeding 
subnational own revenues. Whatever the cause of this fiscal policy choice, the final effect is 
often a culture of transfer dependence, with subnational officials potentially being less 
accountable and likely resulting in less efficient spending, lower tax effort and irresponsible 
borrowing behavior (Stein, 1999; Ross, 2001; Rodden, 2003; Paler, 2013; Jia et al., 2020). More 
specifically, the risk of being financed mostly with transfers is that elected public officials are 
less accountable for their financial decisions because they can increase spending without 
increasing taxes, relieving electoral pressure (Paler, 2013; Ross, 2001). Also, this form of 
 
3 For a comparative review of the first and second generation theory of fiscal federalism, see Martinez‐Vazquez, 





financing can reduce autonomy in public spending decisions and cause a delay in the operations 
of local governments since most transfers are earmarked to a particular purpose and require an 
approval process.  
Another potential impediment to sub-national accountability, which applies whatever the 
vertical fiscal system, is manipulation of taxing and spending according to the electoral cycle. 
The theory of political business cycles (PBC), originating with Nordhaus (1975), proposes a 
model in which incumbent politicians manipulate the budgets and economic conditions to gain 
electoral advantage. Most studies show that voters reward increased public expenditure at 
national, regional and local levels (Akhmedov & Zhuravskaya, 2004; Litschig & Morrison, 
2012). Other researchers conceive the PBC mechanism through changes in the composition of 
expenditure rather than its level (Rogoff, 1990). Mayors, they argue, are more likely to 
manipulate the expenditure components that are visible to the electorate in a manner that could 
signal greater competence. For example, opportunistic behavior might focuses on investment 
expenditures that are highly visible to the electorate, such as infrastructure (Veiga & Veiga, 
2007). Alternatively, capital expenditure might be more rigid due to its long-term nature and also 
challenging to coordinate with elections. For example, there is evidence for developed and 
developing countries, that during election years, public spending shifts towards more visible 
current expenditure (Katsimi & Sarantides, 2012; Vergne, 2009).  
Overall, the literature on government performance has been extended from being initially 
associated with cost-efficiency improvements to having more emphasis on budget effectiveness. 
For example, fiscal prudence refers to discipline in the use of public funds (Rodden, 2002; 
Yilmaz, 1999), and there is evidence that voters can reward such prudent behavior (Brender, 





concept of performance from traditional measures of monetary resources to include information 
on purpose, direction, and impact of government organizations (Ammons, 1997; Carnevale & 
Carnevale, 1993; DuPont-Morales & Harris, 1994).4 Whatever the case, all of these challenges 
make it particularly critical to test empirically whether accountability is truly functioning at the 
sub-national level.  
2.3 Bringing the Literature into Conversation 
Let us, then, draw together these strands of past research. According to the literature on 
fiscal decentralization, transferring resources and responsibilities to lower tiers of government 
can improve public spending efficiency, partially due to accountability and the political 
participation of citizens. According to the literature on electoral accountability, government 
performance can be improved by providing a mechanism through which citizens can reward or 
punish public officials.  
It is clear that our understanding of accountability and its links to decentralization and 
government performance has improved dramatically. Nevertheless, some important gaps in our 
knowledge persist. First and foremost, we have few studies that can draw a direct empirical link 
between local performance indicators and the exercise of democratic mechanisms by voters. 
There is reason to believe that accountability works in the real world, but there are also many 
potential impediments to its operation. We need more direct evidence to know for sure. Do 
citizens consider concrete performance indicators when voting? Only if they do will local elected 
officials be incentivized to provide good governance. 
Another problem is that the evidence for accountability that does exist is concentrated at 
the national level. According to a study done by Berry and Howell (2007), less than 1% of the 
 





212 articles on elections published between 1980 and 2000 in five top political science journals 
examined local elections, none of which concerned retrospective voting. Moreover, the lion’s 
share of studies of accountability have, understandably, focused on elections. By contrast, 
scholars have paid considerably less attention to recall processes as a mechanism of 
accountability.  
Finally, there has been almost no research looking at whether local leaders are held 
accountable for the sources and components of their expenditures. While the public finance 
literature on expenditure composition and on vertical fiscal systems is expansive, few studies 
have explored the relationship between these structures and elections (much less recall). 
Presumably, voters value prudent fiscal management, and they may also prefer leaders who 
engage in a relatively large amount of capital as opposed to current expenditure, which is more 
visible and less at risk of diversion for clientelist purposes. Whether this is true empirically, 
however, is an open question. For all these reasons, our exploration of the link between 
performance and expenditures on the one hand, and elections and recall on the other is unique, 
particularly in its focus on local authorities. If we are able to find strong evidence of systematic, 
local policy responsiveness there, it will put us in a better position to assess the complex paths 
through which such responsiveness may operate.  
3. Tying It All Together: Our Hypotheses 
We draw on the varied concepts discussed above to specify our tests of accountability in 
Peruvian local governments. Beginning with the issue of governance quality, we expect that 
citizens will hold their elected local officials accountable for the quality of service delivery, 
which is measured in our empirical models with performance indicators for solid waste 





mostly at the local level in our empirical case of Peru,5 while the responsibility for primary 
education is shared across all three tiers for government. If accountability is indeed present, 
citizens will reward local officials with reelection and punish them with recall based on their 
performance in these two policy areas. 
Put differently, better performance in both types of services should decrease a Mayor’s 
probability of being revoked and increase their probability of being reelected. If we find that this 
accountability is operational in both service areas, and especially in the more defuse area of 
primary education, it will constitute strong support for our arguments. Holding other variables 
constant, then, we formally specify the following four hypotheses: 
• Mayors who provide a daily collection of municipal solid waste (MSW) have a lower 
probability of being recalled than those who do not offer the service daily. 
• Mayors who provide a daily collection of MSW have a higher probability of being 
reelected than those who do not offer the service daily.  
• An increase in the percentage of dropouts among students in primary school increases 
Mayors’ probability of being recalled. 
• An increase in the percentage of dropouts among students in primary school decreases 
Mayors’ probability of being reelected. 
In addition to the relationship between policy outcomes and accountability, we are also 
interested in how specific types of expenditure affect reelection and recall. While it is clear that 
we should expect better performance to improve the prospects for reelection and reduce the risks 
for recall, the expected relationship between expenditure and accountability may be less 
straightforward. In general, however, we expect that higher expenditures on public goods that 
matter to citizens should improve the chances that local leaders will win elections and avoid 
recall.  
 
5 In the case of dangerous and non-dangerous waste generated by productive areas or industrial facilities, the 





This should be especially the case in systems like Peru (in common with the large 
majority of countries) where local authorities are primarily financed by vertical transfers. Here, 
the question is whether local officials are able to secure more resources from the center and are 
effectively channeling them to the provision of public goods that matter to citizens. When local 
governments raise their own revenue, of course, the support gained from more spending must be 
balanced by the negative effects of higher taxes, and so the relationship may be less clear. These 
considerations lead us to two additional hypotheses: 
• An increase in total local expenditure decreases Mayors’ probability of being recalled. 
• An increase in total local expenditure increases Mayors’ probability of being reelected. 
Finally, we analyze whether the composition of local expenditure has different effects on 
electoral outcomes. Following the conventional economic classification used for expenditure 
budgets and the approach of Veiga (2007), we distinguish between current and capital 
expenditure. Further, we assume that capital expenditures are more highly visible than current 
expenditures to the electorate. This is because investment projects such as infrastructure 
improvement are more readily discernable than, for example, civil service hires.  
Current expenditures are not only less visible but also more at risk of being diverted to 
corrupt or patronage-based uses and may be less likely to yield long-term benefits. The inability 
to follow through with an investment project may be more readily apparent to voters, and harder 
to hide for politicians, than the diversion of current expenses. For all of these reasons, we expect 
that local leaders are likely to be rewarded by their constituents for a relative emphasis on capital 
spending in their overall budgets. 
In addition to these considerations, there is the question, alluded to above, of whether 





ministries and other agencies. We would expect that effectively attracting more central financing 
would increase the popularity of these local leaders, especially since these moneys would not 
come directly from constituents’ wallets. In that context, we specify the additional four 
hypotheses as follows: 
• A higher level of capital expenditure per capita (controlling for current expenditure per 
capita) decreases Mayors’ probability of being recalled. 
• A higher level of capital expenditure per capita (controlling for current expenditure per 
capita) increases Mayors’ probability of being reelected. 
• An increase in the portion of expenditures financed with transfers decreases Mayors’ 
probability of being recalled. 
• An increase in the portion of expenditures financed with transfers increases Mayors’ 
probability of being reelected. 
Other variables we control for are political alignment of the district municipality (the 
lower sub-national level) with the provincial municipality (the higher sub-national level) We also 
control for altitude, land area, and average household expenditures to assess general access to 
public services, as well as for the size of the district and its economic condition. The expected 
effects of these control variables are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Expected Impact on the Probability of Being Revoked and Reelected 
 





Provides daily trash collection service negative positive 
Percentage of dropouts in primary education positive negative 
Fiscal performance   
Percentage of expenditure financed with Transfer negative positive 
Log of exp. per capita financed with Transfer negative positive 
Log of total exp. per capita negative positive 
Log of capital exp. per capita negative positive 
Log of current exp. per capita uncertain uncertain 
Political variables   
Political alignment negative positive 
Male Mayor negative positive 
Number of candidates uncertain uncertain 
Socio-economic variables   





Log of Altitude (meters above sea level) uncertain uncertain 
Log of Territory (square kilometers) uncertain uncertain 
 
4. Our Empirical Case: Peruvian Local Governments 
To test our hypotheses, we make use of extensive new data on local governments in Peru. 
In this sense, our work fits into the “local turn” of much recent work in political economy 
(Singh, 2017). The quality and specificity of the data that we use here allows us to construct a 
much more robust test of our arguments than would be possible in a cross-national test. Of 
course, in taking this approach, we risk losing some of the benefits of generalizability available 
in broader empirical work. But these benefits are compensated for by the greater confidence we 
can have in the identification of the relationships we test. Moreover, Peru is an excellent case for 
our purposes; given that its decentralization process is relatively recent, it is likely that any 
effects we find here will also hold in other contexts. We turn now to a brief explanation of the 
structures and functions of local governments in Peru. 
4.1 Administrative and Political Organization 
Peru has been undergoing a decentralization process since 2002.6 Today, there are three 
major tiers of government: national, regional, and local (or municipal), with this last tier divided 
into provincial and district municipalities. Local governments approve their own budgets and do 
not depend hierarchically on the regional governments. In the same way, district municipalities 
do not depend hierarchically on the provincial municipalities.7  
Local governments consist of a Municipal Council as the policymaking, regulatory and 
oversight body, the Mayor as the head of the executive organ, and a Local Coordination Council 
(CCL) in charge of promoting public participation mechanisms. As we will see, citizens have the 
 
6 The first attempt of decentralization started at the end of the 1980s. The process reflected the incentives of the 
ruling party at the time to build up a subnational power base (Kim, 1992). After following a gradual approach, in 
2006, the central government accelerated the transfer of responsibilities (CGP, 2014). 





right not only to elect their local authorities, but also to request their vacancy or recall from 
office. The vote is universal and compulsory until the age of 70 under the imposition of a fine. 
Local authorities are elected for four years and, until 2018, could run for immediate reelection.8  
Electoral rules and the local political environment influence the elections; voters can only 
cast a single ballot for both Mayor and Local Council, so even if the winning list receives less 
than 50%, the Mayor's party is assured a majority on the local council. Also, small political 
organizations do not face a serious threat of being excluded from future elections if they do not 
reach a minimum number of votes (Crabtree, 2010; Morgenstern & Green, 2009). This has 
caused an increase in the number of lists that compete in local elections (see Table A3), which 
results in a higher vote dispersion across parties and reduces the percentage of votes obtained by 
the winner.9  
The role played by traditional national political parties has also been significant. In 1980, 
national parties had almost full control of local governments. After the 2002 decentralization 
process, subnational political organizations, particularly regional movements, became the leading 
force in local politics. In 2014, regional movements had control of more than 50% of local 
governments (Aragon, Makarin, & Pique, 2015). 
The design of the electoral mechanism and the degree of institutionalization of political 
parties also help explain the significant use of recall referendums (CPRs) (Welp, 2016). To start a 
recall referendum, the National Election Board requires the collection of signatures, but it does 
 
8 Mayors are elected by the highest number of votes. An election held in any district or province is declared invalid 
if the null or blank votes exceed two thirds of the number of valid votes. 
9 Between 1998 and 2006 only a small percentage of local authorities were elected by majority. In 2002, 1.5% of the 
local authorities elected got more than 50% of the votes. In 2006, 57% of the local authorities elected got between 





not mandate a legal process to demonstrate acts of corruption or bad management.10 Since its 
first application in 1997, there have been ten rounds of recalls where more than 5,000 
subnational authorities have been evaluated and more than 1,700 were revoked (see Table A4).11  
4.2 Public Expenditure Structure 
The central government has issued several laws to set the expenditure responsibilities of 
subnational governments. Among local governments, provincial and district municipalities have 
the same expenditure responsibilities; the former also have other additional service 
responsibilities that extend to the district municipalities within the provincial boundaries. 
Subnational spending has increased in recent years. The share of total general 
government spending executed by local governments rose from 13% in 2004 to 20% in 2014. As 
percent of GDP, local government spending rose from 2.5% in 2004 to 4.3% in 2014 (see Table 
A5). However, there are also great horizontal disparities, and the richest district municipality has 
a per capita spending 250 times the spending of the poorest one (see Table A6). 
One of the challenges in the assignment of expenditure responsibilities is the wording of 
the regulation. Many functions overlap between the central government and subnational 
governments, and often there is little clarity in their definitions (see Table A7). The spending 
patterns of the municipalities have also been affected by increased revenue sharing transfers. As 
the proceeds from extractive industries (the so-called Canon transfers) are by law earmarked to 
finance investment projects and associated infrastructure maintenance spending, a significant 
 
10 The most recurrent grounds to request a CPR are: i) non-fulfillment of electoral promises, ii) the authority does 
not call for open councils, iii) irregularities in the procurement process, iv) does not develop infrastructure, and v) 
does not perform all his/her functions (ONPE, 2013a). 
11 Based on this situation, in 2015, the Congress adjusted the laws that regulate elections and recall process. The new 
regulation prohibited the immediate reelection of subnational authorities and required them to resign six months 
before the election if they want to run for a different position. Also, there is only one recall process during the third 
year of the administration period and the replacements of the revoked authorities will remain in office until the end 





permanent bias towards capital spending was created in the structure of subnational 
expenditures. As a result, allocations for public infrastructure projects in the general budget have 
increased on average from 30% in 2004 to 65% in 2014 for local governments; however, 
municipalities often have limited capacity to execute investment projects and face weak 
incentives to build interjurisdictional infrastructure (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2017) . 
To test the relationship between government performance and electoral outcomes, as 
discussed above, we select two services provided by local governments: Municipal Solid Waste 
(MSW) management and Education. The provision of the first service relies almost exclusively 
on local governments, which makes it easier for citizens to identify where responsibility lies. The 
second one is a shared responsibility between the central, regional, and local government, and 
therefore puts a harder test on the accountability hypotheses.  
4.3 Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) 
Peruvian regulation makes the provincial municipalities responsible for managing the 
solid waste of domestic and commercial origin. Also, in coordination with the health sector at the 
national level, they evaluate and identify the appropriate spaces to implement supervised sanitary 
landfills.12 The district municipalities are responsible for the collection and transportation of 
these solid wastes, as well as for the cleaning of streets and public spaces. They also have the 
task of ensuring that fees are charged for the provision of the service based on the criteria 
established by the provincial municipality (MINAM, 2016). Besides the fees, the service is also 
financed from taxes and transfers. During 2013, Peru generated more than 7 million tons of 
municipal solid waste (MSW), 64% household and 36% non-household (see Figure A1).13 Even 
 
12 Agency for Environmental Assessment and Enforcement (OEFA). Report 2013-2014 (in Spanish). 
13 Peru has a population of more than 30 million and more than 23 million live in cities (urban population), 
representing 76% of the total population. The national average of MSW is more than 18 thousand tons per day, of 
which only 48% is disposed in a supervised sanitary landfill; the remnant is being inadequately disposed of in the 





though the service is provided by almost 97% of all municipalities, only 38% of this group offers 
a daily service.14 
4.5 Education 
The main challenge in the Peruvian education system is the quality of the service. Peru 
ranks last among the 65 countries that participated in the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) in 2012.15 All levels of government share the responsibility of provision of 
education services. At the central level, the Ministry of Education manages education policy in 
coordination with regional governments. Local governments, for their part, are not directly 
responsible for the provision of educational services, but rather their role is to support and 
promote education. Within this latter role, possibly the main task of local governments is the 
provision of infrastructure and equipment for schools (World Bank, 2010a). 
The design of the decentralization of education in Peru has been inefficient, and the 
subnational governments’ expenditure powers are not well defined in the legal framework. Thus, 
there are overlaps and also contradictions in the responsibilities among levels of government 
(Consejo Nacional de Educación, 2010). The budget structure for education limits the autonomy 
of decentralized bodies and their ability to improve the quality of services. The budget allocation 
is based on historical records, which limits the possibilities of subnational governments to 
generate significant changes. Also, the funding mechanisms have proved more complex than 
expected, which has led to delays in the transfer of resources and raised transaction costs for the 




14 National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI). Peru: Municipal Management Indicators, 2019 (in 
Spanish). 
15 PISA is an international survey which aims to evaluate education systems. The exam is prepared by the 





4.6 Revenue Structure 
Peruvian municipalities generate revenues from taxes and user charges (for services like 
street cleaning, road tolls, parks maintenance, public safety services, and construction permits).16 
District municipalities collect the property tax and the tax on transfers of real estate, and 
provincial municipalities collect the tax on motor vehicles and taxes on public entertainment, 
lotteries, and gambling. However, the current fiscal decentralization framework provides low 
revenue autonomy to subnational governments (Canavire et al., 2015).17 The central government 
sets the tax rates and regulations on the tax bases. The main characteristics of tax revenue 
assignment can be seen in Table A8. 
Overall, local taxation exhibits low efficiency due to generous exemptions, weak tax 
administration, and the lack of a complete or updated cadaster of properties (Alfaro & Rühling, 
2007). Although there has been a recent improvement in tax collection (see Table A9), the 
performance of the main local tax (property tax) is significantly low relative to other countries in 
the region (Martinez-Vazquez & Sepulveda, 2012) (see Figure A2).  
Overall, the share of own revenues over total revenues has experienced a decreasing 
trend, falling from 36% in 2004 to 26% in 2014. In the case of tax revenues, they represent less 
than 5% of total revenues for most local governments. There are substantial revenue disparities 
among local governments, but in general there is significant dependence on intergovernmental 
transfers. Only in the municipalities of Metropolitan Lima – the capital city – does the tax 
revenue represent as much as 40% of total revenues. As a result, local governments’ finances 
heavily rely on intergovernmental transfers to bridge the gap between increasing spending needs 
 
16 Local governments also have access to borrowing, but due to their reduced access to credit markets and the tight 
borrowing restrictions, the level of indebtedness is very low. 
17 Tax assignments for local governments had been defined in 1993 and the decentralization laws did not change 
them substantially. In the case of regional governments, they do not have tax assignments and their own revenues 





associated with the gradual decentralization of functional responsibilities and their low capacity 
to raise their own revenues.  
4.7 Intergovernmental Transfers 
There are two major types of intergovernmental transfers to local governments: Canon 
and FONCOMUN (FCM). The first comes from sharing in the proceeds of the exploitation of 
natural resources; it is allocated on an origin basis and earmarked for investment and some 
maintenance spending.18 The FCM, on the other hand, is an unconditional equalization transfer 
that is assigned to all local governments by a measure of expenditure needs.19 There is a third 
earmarked transfer, “Ordinary Resources” (OR), set to finance operating costs of decentralized 
functions; however, its allocation criteria seem more discretionary compared to the other two and 
these resources are much more significant at the regional than the local level.20 
The share of Canon in the local governments’ revenue increased from 15% in 2004 to 
39% in 2011 and then fell to 32% in 2014 due to the variation in international commodity prices 
(see Table A11). The evolution of the Canon is the most significant factor influencing the 
distribution of fiscal resources among local governments, as well as their revenue and spending 
patterns. There are around 500 district municipalities (or 30% of all district municipalities) for 
which natural resource-related revenues account for 50% or more of the total (World Bank, 
2010b). 
 
18 The central government collects the taxes from the mining companies and then distributes to subnational 
governments. The distribution criteria is shown in Table A1. 
19 It was established in 1994 with the objective of promoting investment in local governments. It is financed by the 
Municipal Promotion Tax (IPM) which is a surtax rate of 2% on top of the central government's VAT; a tax on 
vehicles that use gasoline; and, a tax on recreational crafts. 
20 Other transfers, less significant in terms of their magnitude, include the Fund for the Promotion of Regional and 
Local Public Investment which provides matching grants for investment projects directed to reduce infrastructure 
and social service delivery gaps; the Socioeconomic Development Fund of the Camisea Project that finances basic 
social infrastructure investments in areas affected by the Camisea Project; and the conditional cash transfer for the 





On the other hand, the relative importance of FCM on local governments’ revenues has 
slightly decreased over time, from 30% of total revenues in 2004 to around 25% in 2014 (see 
Table A11). Its allocation formula does not include fiscal capacity, which means that 
beneficiaries with high fiscal capacity such as the local governments that receive Canon, also 
receive FCM transfers proportionate to their expenditure needs (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 
2017).21  
5. Data and Empirical Methodology 
The main objective of our empirical analysis is to examine the extent to which 
government performance and expenditure structures affect the probabilities of a Mayor of being 
reelected or recalled. For this purpose, we perform a cross-sectional analysis of Peruvian 
municipalities and include a set of control variables to isolate their specific features. The Mayor 
of the district municipality is the unit of analysis. 
We compile our dataset using information from several public organizations22 and 
provide the list of variables and summary statistics in Table 2 and Table 3. Our sample considers 
1,632 district municipalities for the period 2011-2014.23 From that group, 1,267 district Mayors 
(77.6%) were not part of the recall process, 276 (17%) were part of the recall process but not 
revoked, and 89 (5.4%) were revoked. Also, 1,020 (62.5%) decided to run for reelection, in 
which 319 (31.3%) won and 701 (68.7%) lost. 
 
 
21 The first stage in the allocation process considers the expenditure needs at the province level to determine the total 
to be assigned to the province, which affects the districts whose expenditure needs are “higher” than the overall 
province. For example, two identical districts may receive different transfer amounts just because they are in 
provinces with overall different fiscal needs. The formula also guarantees a minimum transfer level to all local 
governments which offset the effect of considering measures of expenditure needs. 
22 The Ministry of Finance (MEF), Ministry of Education (MINEDU), Ministry of Environment (MINAM) and from 
the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI). The electoral data was collected from the National Office 
of Electoral Processes (ONPE) and the National Election Board (JNE). 
23 We took out from the sample the municipalities that were created after 2010 and the case of a province that has 





Table 2. Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Variables / Definition Period Source 
Dependent variables 
  
Recall (RECALL): 0 "Mayor was not part of a 
recall process" 1 "Mayor was part of a recall 
process, but not revoked" 2 "Mayor was part of a 
recall process and revoked." 
2012 & 2013 National Office of Electoral 
Processes (ONPE), National 
Jury of Elections (JNE) 
Reelection (REE3): 0 "Didn't run on 2014 local 
elections" 1 "Didn't win on 2014 local elections" 
2 "Won on 2014 local elections" 
Elections of 2014 ONPE, JNE 
Reelection (REE): 0 "Didn't win on 2014 local 
elections" 1 "Won on 2014 local elections" 
Elections of 2014 ONPE, JNE 
   
Independent variables   
Performance 
  
Daily trash collection service: 1 "provides service 
daily" 0 "otherwise"  
2010-2014 National Registry of 
Municipalities (RENAMU) 




Percentage of expenditure financed with 
Transfer (Canon + FCM) 
2010-2014 Peruvian Ministry of Finance 
(MEF) 
Percentage of expenditure financed with Canon 2010-2014 MEF 
Percentage of expenditure financed with FCM 2010-2014 MEF 
Log of exp. per capita financed with Transfer 
(Canon + FCM) 
2010-2014 MEF 
Log of exp. per capita financed with Canon 2010-2014 MEF 
Log of exp. per capita financed with FCM 2010-2014 MEF 
Log of total exp. per capita 2010-2014 MEF 
Log of capital exp. per capita 2010-2014 MEF 
Log of current exp. per capita 2010-2014 MEF 
Political variables 
  
Number of candidates Elections of 2010 ONPE, JNE 
Political alignment: 1 "same political party as 
province municipality Mayor" 0 "otherwise" 
Elections of 2010 ONPE, JNE 
Gender of Mayor: 0 "female" 1 "male" Elections of 2010 ONPE, JNE 
Socio-economic variables 
  
Log of Avg. of HH monthly exp. (n.s. per capita), 
2013 
2013 National Institute of Statistics 
and Information (INEI) 
Log of Altitude (meters above sea level) NA INEI 















Table 3. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Independent variables      
Performance      
Daily trash collection service, 2010 1632 .3008578 0.45877 0 1 
Daily trash collection service, 2011 1632 0.31495 0.46464 0 1 
Percentage of dropouts in primary 
education, 2011 
1632 3.54142 3.07981 0 39.6 
Percentage of dropouts in primary 
education, 2013 
1632 2.21103 2.02930 0 16.7 
Fiscal performance      
Percentage of expenditure financed with 
Transfer, avg. 2012-2013 
1632 68.49027 20.20906 0.56375 99.49161 
Percentage of expenditure financed with 
Transfer, 2012 
1632 70.63025 22.86505 0.93461 99.51012 
Log of exp. per capita financed with 
Transfer, avg. 2012-2013 
1632 6.46304 0.84507 2.67931 10.15982 
Log of total exp. per capita, avg. 2012-2013 1632 6.94792 0.69517 4.91394 10.19311 
Log of total exp. per capita, 2013 1632 6.89118 0.73748 4.83551 10.27410 
Log of capital exp. per capita, avg. 2012-2013 1632 6.49117 0.88199 2.52453 10.12062 
Log of current exp. per capita, avg. 2012-
2013 
1632 5.73667 0.58888 4.35762 8.93189 
Political variables      
Number of candidates on 2010 local 
elections 
1632 6.88052 2.66270 1 20 
Political alignment 1632 0.29228 0.45495 0 1 
Male 1632 0.96385 0.18673 0 1 
Socio-economic variables      
Log of Household monthly exp., 2013 1632 5.90469 0.36435 4.78458 7.56783 
Log of Altitude 1632 7.12771 1.58405 1.09861 8.44998 
Log of Territory 1632 5.27317 1.42677 0.68813 10.08789 
 
We consider as measures of performance (1) the frequency of trash collection, and (2) the 
percentage of students who drop out of primary school. In the first case, waste management is 
part of the targets of the 11th Sustainable Development Goals and the municipalities are 
responsible for waste management in their jurisdictions. In the second case, there are examples 
of support from municipalities to schools, and articulation of education and health services with 
social programs, but there is still a lack of clarity of the responsibilities of this level of 
government (Consejo Nacional de Educación, 2010). To test the effect of the expenditure 
funding sources, we consider the expenses financed with transfers. To test the effect of the 





Our first dependent variable is ordinal, with a value of 0 if the Mayor is not part of a 
recall process, 1 if the Mayor is part of the recall process but not revoked, and 2 if the Mayor is 
revoked. We use an Ordered logit model to analyze the effect of the covariates in the recall 
process. Our second dependent variable is a dummy with a value of 1 if the Mayor was reelected 
and 0 otherwise. We use a probit binary model to analyze the effect of the covariates in the 
reelection process. We develop the details of each model in the following sections. 
5.1 Probability of Being Recalled 
We use an ordered logit model to analyze the effect of the covariates in the recall process. 
As noted above, our dependent variable is 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖, an ordinal variable with a value of 0 if the 
Mayor is not part of a recall process, 1 if the Mayor is part of the recall process but not revoked, 
and 2 if the Mayor is revoked.  
 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥1𝛼𝛼 + 𝑥𝑥2𝛽𝛽 + 𝑥𝑥3𝛿𝛿 + 𝑥𝑥4𝛾𝛾 +  𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 1.1 
𝑥𝑥1 is a fixed matrix that includes the variables related to performance: daily provision of 
MSW and percentage of dropouts in primary education: 𝑥𝑥1𝛼𝛼 = 𝛼𝛼1𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖. 𝑥𝑥2 is a 
matrix that includes the variables related to expenditure. Depending on how these covariates are 
decomposed, we consider four different models:  
Model 1: natural log of total expenditure per capita considered as a single covariate and 
the natural log of total expenditure financed with transfers per capita, 𝑥𝑥2𝛽𝛽 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡_𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽2𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡_𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖;  
Model 2: natural log of total expenditure per capita considered as a single covariate and 
the share of the expenditures finance with transfers, 𝑥𝑥2𝛽𝛽 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡_𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡_𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖;  
Model 3: natural log of total expenditure per capita divided into current and capital 
expenditures and the natural log of total expenditures finance with transfers per capita, 𝑥𝑥2𝛽𝛽 =
𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡_𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖; and 
Model 4: natural log of total expenditure per capita divided into current and capital 
expenditures and the share of the expenditures financed with transfers, 𝑥𝑥2𝛽𝛽 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽2𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡_𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖.  
𝑥𝑥3 is a fixed matrix that includes the political variables: 𝑥𝑥3𝛿𝛿 = 𝛿𝛿1𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 +





variables and the intercept: 𝑥𝑥4𝛾𝛾 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖. 
5.2 Probability of Being Reelected 
We use a probit binary model to analyze the effect of the covariates in the reelection 
process. Our dependent variable is reelection (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖), a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the 
Mayor is reelected and 0 otherwise.  
 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥1𝛼𝛼 + 𝑥𝑥2𝛽𝛽 + 𝑥𝑥3𝛿𝛿 + 𝑥𝑥4𝛾𝛾 +  𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 1.2 
𝑥𝑥1 is a fixed matrix that includes the variables related to performance, daily provision of 
MSW and percentage of dropouts in primary education: 𝑥𝑥1𝛼𝛼 = 𝛼𝛼1𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖. 
𝑥𝑥2 is a matrix that includes the variables related to expenditure. Depending on how these 
covariates are decomposed, we consider two different models:  
Model 1: natural log of total expenditure per capita considered as a single covariate and 
the share of the expenditures finance with transfers, 𝑥𝑥2𝛽𝛽 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡_𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡_𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖; and,  
Model 2: natural log of total expenditure per capita considered as a single covariate and 
the natural log of total expenditure finance with transfers per capita, 𝑥𝑥2𝛽𝛽 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡_𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽2𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡_𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖.24 
𝑥𝑥3 is a fixed matrix that includes the political variables: 𝑥𝑥3𝛿𝛿 = 𝛿𝛿1𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 +
𝛿𝛿2𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿3𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖.  
Finally, 𝑥𝑥4 is a fixed matrix that includes the control variables and the intercept: 𝑥𝑥4𝛾𝛾 =
𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖. 
In the previous models, we do not consider the potential sample selection bias because 
Mayors are likely to self-select themselves to run again or desist depending on their perceptions 
of winning. To take this potential source of bias into consideration, we use an ordinal dependent 
variable (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅3𝑖𝑖) with a value of 0 if the Mayor lost the 2014 local elections; 1 if the Mayor did 
 
24 We test the same four models that were used for the probability to be revoked, but not all coefficients were 





not run in the 2014 local elections; and, 2 if the Mayor was reelected. 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅3𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥1𝛼𝛼 + 𝑥𝑥2𝛽𝛽 +
𝑥𝑥3𝛿𝛿 + 𝑥𝑥4𝛾𝛾 +  𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 where 𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2, 𝑥𝑥3 and 𝑥𝑥4 represent the same set of matrices introduce for the 
previous model.  
To address the sample selection bias issue, we also use a Heckman selection model with 
the Mayor’s affiliation to a political party (rather than other types of political organizations) as an 
instrumental variable. 
6. Results 
6.1 Probability of Being Recalled 
Table 4 presents our estimates, reported as odds-ratios, of the effect of performance and 
expenditure outcomes on the probability of a Mayor to be revoked. In order to test the 
proportional odds assumption in our models, we applied the oparallel command; the outcomes 
confirm the relationship is proportional across all the test statistics for the four models (see 
results in Table 5).  
Table 4. Effect of Fiscal and Policy Variables in Probability of Mayors to be Revoked 
(OLOGIT-odds-ratio) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Daily trash collection service, 2010 0.719** 0.724** 0.713** 0.719** 
Percentage of dropouts, primary edu., 2011 1.042** 1.041** 1.038** 1.037** 
Political alignment 0.716** 0.721** 0.712** 0.714** 
Mayor-Male 0.545** 0.534** 0.573* 0.567** 
Number of candidates in 2010 local elections 0.917*** 0.916*** 0.921*** 0.921*** 
Log of Avg. of HH monthly exp. (n.s. per capita), 
2013 
0.517*** 0.515*** 0.438*** 0.437*** 
Log of Altitude 0.833*** 0.835*** 0.860*** 0.857*** 
Log of Territory 0.901** 0.910** 0.925* 0.926* 
Log of current exp. per capita, avg. 2012-2013   1.529*** 1.791*** 
Log of capital exp. per capita, avg. 2012-2013   0.542*** 0.726*** 
Log of total exp. per capita, avg. 2012-2013 0.514*** 1.001   
Log of exp. per capita financed with Transfer, 
avg. 2012-2013 
2.004***  1.606***  
Exp. financed with Transfer (%), avg. 2012-2013  1.015***  1.011*** 
Constant cut1 0.00307*** 0.00971*** 0.00937*** 0.0144*** 
Constant cut2 0.0161*** 0.0509** 0.0498** 0.0765* 
Observations 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632 
Pseudo R2 0.0345 0.0348 0.0432 0.0441 





process" 1 "Mayor was part of a recall process, but not revoked" 2 "Mayor was part of a recall process and 
revoked". 
Table 5. Tests of the Parallel Regression Assumption 
 
 Chi2 df P>Chi2   Chi2 df P>Chi2 
Model 1    Model 2    
Wolfe Gould 13.11 10 0.218 Wolfe Gould 12.29 10 0.266 
Brant 11.43 10 0.325 Brant 10.38 10 0.408 
score 13.31 10 0.207 score 12.34 10 0.263 
likelihood ratio 13.09 10 0.219 likelihood ratio 12.23 10 0.270 
Wald 14.12 10 0.168 Wald 12.90 10 0.229 
        
Model 3    Model 4    
Wolfe Gould 14.18 11 0.223 Wolfe Gould 13.32 11 0.273 
Brant 13.59 11 0.256 Brant 11.99 11 0.364 
score 16.26 11 0.132 score 14.41 11 0.211 
likelihood ratio 15.72 11 0.152 likelihood ratio 14.15 11 0.225 
Wald 16.99 11 0.108 Wald 14.77 11 0.193 
 
The Coefficients of the variables of interest are significant and consistent across the four 
models. Both measures of performance (daily provision of garbage collection and percentage of 
dropouts among students in primary school) show the expected sign and are statistically 
significant. These results provide strong support to the hypothesis that voters reward and punish 
their elected local officials based on performance. 
The measures of expenditure components, for their part, have differential effects on the 
probability of being recalled. When Mayors increase total expenses per capita, it decreases the 
risk of recall; this is as expected, since spending is likely associated with improved service 
provision. However, not all increases in spending, when we consider the different expenditure 
components, work the same. Increases in current expenses per capita lead to a higher probability 
of recall. This comports with our theoretical predictions, since current spending is more likely to 
be connected to inefficiencies and tends to be much less visible than capital spending. Such an 
effect is likely to be even greater in a system where local governments rely more fully on own-
source revenues. 





of government (namely, the Mayor of the provincial municipality). Consistent with Holland and 
Incio (2019), the results also show a bias against women Mayors, who, other things equal, are 
more likely to be recalled than men. In addition, a higher number of candidates in the elections 
of 2010 seems to reduce the probability of a Mayor being revoked. Finally, the control variables 
show that more problematic geographic accessibility (measured as higher altitude and bigger 
territory) decreases the probability of being revoked. 
6.2 Probability of Being Reelected 
In the reelection process, the dependent variable is subject to a previous action made by 
Mayors (the decision to run for reelection), which may bias the results of a standard model. To 
test for this possibility, we initially run the analysis without controlling for selection bias and 
with the depended variable categorized as 0 if the Mayor lost on 2014 local elections; 1 if the 
Mayor did not run on 2014 local elections; and 2 if the Mayor was reelected (the results are 
shown in Table 6). We then compare the results of the ordered probit model and a multinomial 
probit model and compute the proportional odds assumption with a LR test. Table 7 shows 
evidence that the assumption of the simple model has been violated which means, not 














Table 6. Effect of Fiscal and Policy Variables in Probability of Mayors to be Reelected 
(OPROBIT and MPROBIT estimates) 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 oprobit- oprobit mprobit-Model 1 mprobit-Model 2 
 Model 1 Model 2 Didn’t run Won Didn’t run Won 
Daily trash collection 
service, 2011 
0.160** 0.161** 0.234** 0.254** 0.235** 0.253** 
(0.0645) (0.0645) (0.108) (0.118) (0.108) (0.118) 
Percentage of dropouts,  -0.0235 -0.0244* -0.0721*** -0.0248 -0.0719*** -0.0274 
primary edu., 2013 (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0236) (0.0258) (0.0236) (0.0258) 
Political alignment -0.000813 0.00306 0.0399 -0.0278 0.0366 -0.0178 
 (0.0619) (0.0619) (0.103) (0.115) (0.103) (0.115) 
Male 0.233 0.216 0.428 0.305 0.436* 0.272 
 (0.156) (0.156) (0.263) (0.272) (0.263) (0.272) 
Number of candidates -0.0539*** -0.0557*** -0.0812*** -0.0870*** -0.0798*** -0.0906*** 
In 2010 local elections (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0193) (0.0212) (0.0195) (0.0215) 
Log of Household  0.239** 0.232** 0.443*** 0.369** 0.446*** 0.349** 
monthly exp. , 2013 (0.0932) (0.0932) (0.155) (0.167) (0.155) (0.167) 
Log of Altitude 0.0107 0.0140 0.265*** -0.0362 0.261*** -0.0308 
 (0.0216) (0.0219) (0.0380) (0.0377) (0.0384) (0.0380) 
Log of Territory 0.0268 0.0323 0.0605* 0.0399 0.0555 0.0508 
 (0.0218) (0.0220) (0.0365) (0.0392) (0.0369) (0.0395) 
Log of total exp. per  0.120***  -0.0490 0.250***   
capita, 2013 (0.0411)  (0.0692) (0.0742)   
Exp. financed with  -0.00284**  0.00131 -0.00579**   
Transfer (%), 2012 (0.00129)  (0.00218) (0.00231)   
Log of total exp. per   0.220***   -0.143 0.429*** 
capita, avg. 2012-2013  (0.0727)   (0.125) (0.126) 
Log of Exp. per capita financed  
with Transfer, avg. 2012-2013 
-0.135**   0.106 -0.252** 
(0.0628)   (0.109) (0.108) 
Constant cut1 1.923*** 1.939***     
 (0.700) (0.707)     
Constant cut2 2.979*** 2.994***     
 (0.702) (0.708)     
Constant   -4.496*** -3.794*** -4.410*** -3.746*** 
   (1.171) (1.257) (1.181) (1.271) 
       
Observations 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632 
Pseudo R2 0.0150 0.0143     
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables: REE3 












Table 7. Testing the Proportionality of Odds Assumption Using the Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
Variables (1) Omodel Model 1 (2) Omodel Model 2 
Daily trash collection service, 2011 0.160** 0.161** 
 (0.0645) (0.0645) 
Percentage of dropouts,  -0.0235 -0.0244* 
primary education, 2013 (0.0143) (0.0143) 
Political alignment -0.000813 0.00306 
 (0.0619) (0.0619) 
Male 0.233 0.216 
 (0.156) (0.156) 
Number of candidates in 2010 -0.0539*** -0.0557*** 
local elections (0.0116) (0.0117) 
Log of Avg. of HH monthly exp.  0.239** 0.232** 
(n.s. per capita), 2013 (0.0932) (0.0932) 
Log of Altitude 0.0107 0.0140 
 (0.0216) (0.0219) 
Log of Territory 0.0268 0.0323 
 (0.0218) (0.0220) 
Log of total exp. per capita, 2013 0.120***  
 (0.0411)  
Exp. financed with Transfers (%), 2012 -0.00284**  
 (0.00129)  
Log of total exp. per capita,   0.220*** 
avg. 2012-2013  (0.0727) 
Log of Exp. per capita financed   -0.135** 
with Transfer, avg. 2012-2013  (0.0628) 
Cut1 1.923*** 1.939*** 
 (0.700) (0.707) 
Cut2 2.979*** 2.994*** 
 (0.702) (0.708) 
Observations 1,632 1,632 
Pseudo R2 0.0150 0.0143 
Approximate likelihood-ratio test of equality of 
coefficients across response categories 
chi2(10) =  97.74 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
chi2(10) =  99.45 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables: REE3 
(0=didn’t run; 1=Run but lost; 2=Run and won). 
 
The results of the effect of performance and expenditure on the probability of a Mayor to 
be reelected can be seen in Table 8. In the first two columns, we present for comparison the 
results of the probit model without correcting the selection bias. The second two columns contain 
our primary, correct Heckman probit model.25  
 
 





Table 8. Effect of Fiscal and Policy Variables on Probability of Mayors to be Reelected –
(PROBIT and HECKMAN Estimates) 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 probit- probit heckprobit heckprobit 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Daily trash collection service, 2011 0.183* 0.182* 0.110** 0.105** 
(0.0955) (0.0954) (0.0531) (0.0530) 
Dropouts, primary edu. (%), 2013 -0.0163 -0.0188 -0.0144 -0.0161 
(0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0113) (0.0112) 
Political alignment -0.0296 -0.0203 -0.0151 -0.00982 
 (0.0931) (0.0930) (0.0497) (0.0500) 
Male 0.215 0.189 0.0915 0.0916 
 (0.211) (0.211) (0.104) (0.105) 
Number of candidates in 2010 local 
elec. 
-0.0654*** -0.0679*** -0.0376*** -0.0376*** 
(0.0169) (0.0172) (0.00817) (0.00826) 
Log of Avg. of HH monthly  
exp. per capita, 2013 
0.281** 0.268** 0.189** 0.180** 
(0.131) (0.131) (0.0738) (0.0731) 
Log of Altitude -0.0424 -0.0371 -0.0278 -0.0233 
 (0.0301) (0.0303) (0.0182) (0.0182) 
Log of Territory 0.0289 0.0384 0.0185 0.0240 
 (0.0313) (0.0315) (0.0179) (0.0178) 
Log of total exp. per capita, 2013 0.209***  0.133***  
(0.0594)  (0.0339)  
Exp. financed with Transfer (%), 2012 -0.00470**  -0.00240**  
(0.00183)  (0.00102)  
Log of total exp. per capita,  
avg. 2012-2013 
 0.364***  0.219*** 
 (0.0998)  (0.0576) 
Log of exp. per capita financed  
with Transfer, avg. 2012-2013 
 -0.217**  -0.120** 
 (0.0859)  (0.0523) 
Constant -2.910*** -2.886*** -1.418** -1.422** 
 (0.985) (1.000) (0.578) (0.585) 
Selection equation (likely to run for reelection)     
Run for 2010 local elections with a 
political party 
  0.170*** 0.169*** 
  (0.0497) (0.0498) 
Constant   0.259*** 0.259*** 
   (0.0352) (0.0353) 
Rho     
Constant   -5.566 -5.303 
   (788.926) (78.193) 
Observations 1,020 1,020 1,632 1,632 
Pseudo R2 0.0408 0.0378   
Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) =   10.07 9.03 
Prob > chi2 =   0.0015 0.0026 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables: REE 
(0=Lost on 2014 local elections 1=Won on 2014 local elections). 
 





being reelected, but only the first one (waste collection) is significant. This provides fairly strong 
evidence for our hypotheses. From the measures of expenditure based on its components, the 
total expenditure per capita has a significant and positive effect on the probability of being 
reelected, but in this case we did not find different effects based on the recurrent versus capital 
components. Finally, a higher number of candidates in the elections of 2010 seems to reduce the 
probability of a Mayor of being reelected. The rest of the political and control variables were not 
statistically significant.  
The only result which runs counter to our expectations concerns the political impact of 
financing expenditures with vertical transfers. Surprisingly, increased transfer financing 
(controlling for total expenditures) reduces the probability that local leaders will be reelected and 
increases the probability that they will be recalled. We speculate that perhaps this unanticipated 
result indicates that the ability of local authorities to raise own-source revenue, and thus have a 
reduced reliance on transfers, is associated with higher levels of overall performance and 
therefore also higher levels of political popularity.  
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we consider whether individual voters use rational performance criteria to 
hold their local leaders to account. Accountability is a critical benefit of democracy, and it is also 
among the central justifications for decentralization. Indeed, without accountability, it would be 
difficult to justify the devolution of authority to elected local governments. 
 Despite this fact, however, few studies have documented the existence of local 
accountability in a systematic and empirically rigorous fashion. We attempt to do that here with a 
comprehensive empirical analysis of Peruvian municipalities. The advantage of using a country 





analyze the presence of electoral accountability from the perspective of the voter. This paper 
focuses on two mechanisms of electoral accountability: recalls and elections. Even though both 
mechanisms follow a similar structure, recalls allow the removal of elected representatives 
before the end of their regular terms and have proven more controversial in the literature as an 
effective instrument for enhanced accountability. 
Our empirical tests show clearly that local accountability is functioning in Peru. The 
probability of reelection and recall are both linked to government performance indicators on 
waste disposal and education, and are also associated with the type and level of expenditures. 
More specifically, we find that government performance is especially important in a Mayor’s 
probability of being recalled, though it also matters for reelection. Other things equal, increasing 
total expenses per capita reduces recall and increases reelection. We also find that voters even 
pay attention to expenditure components, favoring capital spending, at least in the case of recalls.  
Of course, the local accountability system in Peru, as elsewhere, is unlikely to be perfect. 
Recalled Mayors, for example, sometimes run again and are elected, and the recall system itself 
is likely subject to political abuse. The system also shows a bias against woman Mayors. That 
said, our results are encouraging for those who support local elections, as they indicate that 
voters use their democratic tools, at least to some degree, rationally and effectively. This means 
that one of the vital preconditions for the benefits of decentralization appears to be met in the 
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Table A1. Types of Performance Measures 
 
Type Definition Example 
Inputs Measures of financial and nonfinancial 
resources that are applied when 
providing services.  
The amount spent on road maintenance 




Measures of regular activities 
conducted within the organization.  
The number of applications processed. 
Outputs Measures of the number of services 
provided or the quantity of service that 
meets a certain quality requirement.  
The number of lane miles of road 
repaired or the number of serious 
crimes reported. 
Outcomes Measures of the results that occur, at 
least in part, because of services 
provided. This may include initial, 
intermediate, or long-term outcomes.  
The percentage of lane miles of road 
maintained in excellent, good, or fair 
condition or the clearance rate for 
serious crimes, or the percentage of 
residents rating their neighborhood as 
safe or very safe. 
Cost 
/Efficiency 
Measures of the resources used, such 
as the cost per unit of output or 
outcome. 
The cost per lane mile or road repaired 
or the cost per serious crime 





Measures of the quality of the 
outputs/outcomes and assessment of 
the quality of the service/program by 
stakeholders.  
The extent to which customers are 
satisfied with an aspect of service 
delivery. 
Explanatory Relating to factors other than the 
services being provided that may have 
affected the reported performance. 
The percentage of trucks in vehicle 
traffic or the unemployment rate in the 
community. 
Benchmarks The comparison of performance data 
to other similar entities or timeframes.  
Comparing a particular performance 
measure of one of your state programs 
with that same measure from a similar 
program of another state government. 
Source: (Melkers & Willoughby, 2005; Willoughby, 2004) 
 
Table A2. Number and Population of District Municipalities, 2007-2015 
 














2007 1,639 12,677 43,776 188 922,833 
2008 1,639 12,849 44,644 186 942,619 
2009 1,639 13,021 45,531 185 962,554 
2010 1,643 13,184 46,398 184 983,095 
2011 1,643 13,363 47,304 182 1,000,000 
2012 1,643 13,533 48,019 181 1,000,000 
2013 1,647 13,777 48,805 180 1,000,000 
2014 1,655 13,991 50,712 178 1,100,000 
2015 1,658 14,155 51,424 177 1,100,000 





Table A1. Number of Lists that Competed in Local Elections, by Election Year 
 
 1998 2002 2006 2010 
More than 17  0.8% 0.4% 0.3% 
Between 11 and 17 2.2% 18.3% 9.6% 10.8% 
Between 6 and 10 31.6% 62.4% 57.3% 58.2% 
Less than 6 66.2% 18.5% 32.7% 30.6% 
Number of municipalities 1,811 1,834 1,834 1,834 
Total lists 7,690 14,965 12,747 13,052 
Source: (INFOGOB-JNE) 
 
Table A2. Recall Processes in Peruvian Local Governments from 1997 to 2013 
  
1997 2001 2004 2005 2008 2009 2012 2013 
Number of recall processes         
Provincial municipalities 1 1 1  3  4 1 
District municipalities 60 172 187 21 242 72 266 126 
         
Authorities         
Mayors         
Part of the process 61 166 187 19 240 67 264 591 
Revoked 42 11 29 11 95 22 69 188 
         
Councilmen 
Part of the process 129 462 691 75 999 271 1040 42 
Revoked 93 27 109 42 444 132 400 25 
Source: (ONPE, 2013b) 
 
Table A3. Local Government Expenditures as a Percent of GDP, 2004-2014 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Current 
expenditures 1.45 1.37 1.30 1.42 1.56 1.72 1.72 1.69 1.89 1.84 1.82 
Capital 
expenditures 0.91 0.91 1.33 1.34 2.08 2.54 2.40 1.86 2.45 2.63 2.45 
Debt  
service 0.16 0.17 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.06 
Total 2.52 2.45 2.73 2.82 3.70 4.33 4.22 3.60 4.40 4.54 4.32 













Table A6. Per Capita Spending by Type of Municipality, 2009-2014 (in New Sols of 2014) 
  
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Provincial municipality1 
      
Max 21,868 36,157 17,243 21,866 21,850 20,845 
Min 183 232 255 331 314 353 
CoV 1.48 2.01 1.25 1.20 1.09 1.05 
# of province municipalities 195 195 195 195 195 195 
       
District municipality 
      
Max 25,825 45,829 37,291 24,815 29,913 33,122 
Min 120 122 110 137 130 128 
CoV 1.18 1.58 1.31 1.12 1.29 1.18 
# of district municipalities 1,622 1,626 1,632 1,637 1,637 1,637 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
1 The amounts are divided by the population of the provincial municipality’s district. 
 
Table A4. Allocation of Responsibilities by Level of Government 
 Exclusive Shared 
Central Foreign relations · Defense, national 
security, and armed forces · Justice, except 
Justice administration · Internal order, 
national and border police · The tax 
administration of national scope and 
national public borrowing · Foreign trade 
and tariff policy ·Regulation of merchant 
marine and commercial air transport · 
Regulation of public services · Regulation of 
public infrastructure of national scope · Any 
others set by law by the Constitution · Design 
and supervision of national and sectoral 
policies, which are compulsory for all levels 
of government 
All other responsibilities 
Regional Regional development plans and executing 
corresponding socio-economic programs · 
The internal organization of the regional 
government · Promote and implement public 
investment of regional scope in roads, 
communications, and basic services · 
Development of tourism circuits · 
Administer state land within their 
jurisdiction (except municipal land) · 
Demarcation of territorial limits within the 
region · Modernization of small and medium 
enterprises · Promote sustainable use of 
forestry and biodiversity resources 
Education: management of education services 
for pre-school, primary, secondary, and higher 
education (except university) · Public health · 
Regulation of economic activities in their 
sphere · Sustainable management of natural 
resources and improving the environment · 
Preserving and administering regional natural 
reserves · Culture and arts · Regional 






Local Urban and rural municipal development · 
Management and regulation of local public 
services · The internal organization of the 
local government · Local development 
planning · Execution and monitoring of local 
public infrastructure 
Education: take part in management of 
education services as would be determined in 
the sectoral law · Public health · Culture, 
tourism, recreation, and sports · Security 
(seguridad ciudadana) · Monument 
conservation · Public transport and traffic · 
Housing and urban rehabilitation · Service and 
management of social programs · Management 
of social programs · Waste management 
Source: (World Bank, 2010b) 




Table A5. Main Characteristics of Municipal Tax Revenue Assignments 
  




Land and buildings 100% (5% for 
cadaster 
maintenance) 
0% < 15 UIT: 0.2% (or 0.6%) 
15-60 UIT: 0.6% 
> 60 UIT: 1.0% 
Property transfers 50% 50% (to Municipal 
Investment Fund) 
3% (first 3 UIT exempted)  
Games (pinball, bingo, etc.) 100% 0% 10% 
Public shows 100% 0% Bullfighting: 5% 
Horse racing: 10% 
Others: 15% 
Provincial administration: 
Vehicle property 0% 100% 1% (minimum: 1.5% UIT) 
Bets 40% 60% 20% (horse racing: 12%) 
Games (lotteries) 0% 100% 10% 
Notes: The Law Decree No. 776 establishes taxes on the property as the main tax revenue 
sources for municipalities. There is also a set of national taxes that correspond to the 
municipalities but are collected by the central government which later transfer to them. UIT or 










2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013





other legal payments equivalent to 3,950 new soles in 2016 (US$ 1,170 on December 24, 2015). 
Source: Gomez, Martinez-Vazquez, & Sepulveda (2010). 
 
Figure A2. Property Tax to GDP Ratio, Peru and Selected Comparators 
 
 
Note: We are comparing the component “4100-Recurrent taxes on immovable property.” 
Source: (OECD). 
 
Table A6. Revenue Composition of Local Governments, 2004-2014 (as a percent of GDP) 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Own revenues 0.91 0.91 0.74 0.84 0.91 0.97 0.88 0.88 0.95 0.93 0.89 
Property tax1 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.39 0.41 0.39 
Other tax  0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 
Nontax  0.62 0.61 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.58 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.47 0.44 
            
Transfers 1.47 1.65 1.78 2.73 2.66 2.08 2.29 2.52 2.60 2.35 2.19 
Canon3 0.38 0.66 0.91 1.71 1.53 1.17 1.14 1.37 1.50 1.26 1.08 
FCM 0.76 0.79 0.81 0.86 0.92 0.82 0.78 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.86 
Other  0.33 0.20 0.05 0.16 0.22 0.09 0.37 0.35 0.28 0.28 0.25 
            
Capital 
revenues4 0.15 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.21 0.24 0.15 0.21 0.17 0.31 
            
Total 2.53 2.64 2.62 3.67 3.68 3.27 3.41 3.56 3.75 3.45 3.39 
1 includes vehicle property, property transfer and land, and buildings property. 
2 Includes fees, rental of property, service charges, sales of goods, fines, and others. 
3 includes canon, sobrecanon, royalties, customs duties, and concession rights. 
4 Includes sales of assets and capital transfers. 





Table A10. Distribution Procedure for the Revenues from Canon 
 
Share Beneficiaries Distribution Criteria 
10% District municipalities within which the 
natural resources are exploited 
Equal share 
25% Municipalities of the province within which 
the natural resources are exploited 
Population and Unmet Basic 
Needs 
40% Municipalities of the region within which 
the natural resources are exploited 
Population and Unmet Basic 
Needs 
25 % 80% to Regional Government of the region, 
and 20% to the universities in the region 
 
Notes: The criteria apply to the revenues collected from the exploitation of mining, gas, hydro-
energetic, fishing and forest resources (excludes oil canon). The oil canon is governed by 
different rules for the areas of Loreto, Ucayali, Piura, Tumbes, and Huánuco. 
Source: (Canavire-Bacarreza, Martinez-Vazquez, & Sepulveda, 2012) and Law No. 27506 (Law 
on the Canon). 
 
Table A11. Revenue Structure of Local Governments, 2004-2014 (as Percent) 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Own revenues 36 34 28 23 25 30 26 25 25 27 26 
Property tax1 9 9 8 8 9 10 10 10 10 12 12 
Other tax  2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 
Nontax  24 23 18 14 15 18 14 14 14 14 13 
            
Transfers 58 63 68 75 72 64 67 71 69 68 65 
Canon3 15 25 35 47 41 36 33 39 40 36 32 
FCM 30 30 31 24 25 25 23 22 22 24 25 
Other  13 8 2 4 6 3 11 10 8 8 7 
            
Capital 
revenues4 6 3 4 3 3 6 7 4 5 5 9 
            
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1 includes vehicle property, property transfer and land, and buildings property. 
2 Includes fees, rental of property, service charges, sales of goods, fines, and others. 
3 includes canon, sobrecanon, royalties, customs duties, and concession rights. 
4 Includes sales of assets and capital transfers. 
















Table A12. Own Revenue per Capita by Type of Municipality (in New Sols of 2014) 
 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Provincial municipalities1       
Max 2,822 3,328 3,695 4,428 3,823 3,589 
Min 3 3 3 0 5 0 
St. Dev 247 276 299 361 404 366 
Average 118 129 131 146 173 165 
CoV 2.09 2.14 2.28 2.47 2.34 2.22 
# of provincial municipalities 195 195 195 195 195 195 
       
District municipalities       
Max 5,414 4,766 2,566 2,954 2,995 3,182 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
St. Dev 223 243 183 193 215 219 
Average 75 85 81 86 95 95 
CoV 2.96 2.86 2.26 2.25 2.27 2.31 
# of district municipalities 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637 
1 The amounts are divided by the population of the districts where the provincial municipality is 
located. 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
 
Table A13. Tax Revenue per Capita by Type of Municipality (in New Sols of 2014) 
 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Provincial municipalities1       
Max 1,398 1,794 1,963 2,362 2,527 2,418 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
St. Dev 103 133 146 176 245 223 
Average 26 32 35 41 55 53 
CoV 4.01 4.11 4.13 4.35 4.45 4.20 
# of province municipalities 195 195 195 195 195 195 
       
District municipalities       
Max 5,039 4,642 1,206 1,435 1,512 1,620 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
St. Dev 138 156 73 79 93 93 
Average 16 21 18 19 22 22 
CoV 8.50 7.49 4.11 4.14 4.24 4.26 
# of district municipalities 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637 
1 The amounts are divided by the population of the districts where the provincial municipality is 
located. 









Table A14. Non-Tax Revenue per Capita by Type of Municipality (in New Sols of 2014) 
 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Provincial municipalities1       
Max 1,425 1,534 1,732 2,066 1,855 1,347 
Min 2 2 2 0 4 0 
St. Dev 171 173 174 219 227 194 
Average 92 97 95 106 118 112 
CoV 1.85 1.78 1.82 2.07 1.93 1.74 
# of province municipalities 195 195 195 195 195 195 
       
District municipalities       
Max 2,958 3,218 2,193 2,458 2,020 2,338 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
St. Dev 146 160 138 145 152 157 
Average 59 64 63 67 73 73 
CoV 2.47 2.49 2.19 2.17 2.09 2.16 
# of district municipalities 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637 
1 The amounts are divided by the population of the provincial municipality’s districts. 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
 
Table A15. Characteristics of Local Governments Own Revenues, 2014 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Log of Total own 
revenue per 
capita 
Log of Tax 
revenue per 
capita 
Log of Non-tax 
revenue per 
capita 
Log of average household  1.782*** 2.334*** 1.477*** 
spending per capita, 2013 (0.121) (0.0962) (0.121) 
Producing Districts 0.853*** 0.210** 0.893*** 
 (0.116) (0.0919) (0.116) 
Provincial municipality 0.213* 0.644*** 0.228** 
 (0.110) (0.0874) (0.110) 
Lima province 0.919*** 0.927*** 0.909*** 
 (0.229) (0.182) (0.229) 
Urban rate (%) 0.00984*** 0.00454*** 0.00909*** 
 (0.00145) (0.00115) (0.00145) 
Log of Area (square 
kilometers) 
0.163*** 0.0320 0.170*** 
(0.0254) (0.0201) (0.0254) 
Log of Altitude (meters) 0.127*** -0.210*** 0.193*** 
 (0.0235) (0.0186) (0.0235) 
Constant -9.448*** -11.44*** -8.316*** 
 (0.785) (0.622) (0.786) 
    
Observations 1,843 1,843 1,843 
R-squared 0.308 0.578 0.248 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variables are 
express in log. The US Dollar to Peruvian new sols exchange rate on December 2014 was as 1 
USD = 2.9798 new sols. 





Table A16. Equalization Goals, Allocation Factors and International Practice 
Source: Boex & Martinez-Vazquez (2007) 
 











Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Goals Factors Country examples 




indicators (separately or in 
a combined indicator), or 
national expenditure 
standards 
India, Italy, Nigeria's Federation 
Account, South Africa's Equitable 
Shares, Spain, Uganda's 
Unconditional Grant. 
Enable similar levels 






Canada's Equalization Grant. 
Enable similar levels 
of service at similar 
levels of taxation 
Fiscal gap = Expenditure 
needs − Fiscal capacity, or 
some other combination of 
needs and capacity 
Australia, China, Germany, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Latvia, 
Russia, UK, Netherlands’ Municipal 
Fund, Uganda's Equalization Grant. 
Distribution on an 
equal per capita basis 
Population Some transfers in Canada, Ecuador, 
Estonia, Germany, Hungary, and 
England. 
